The Second-Price Knapsack Problem: Near-Optimal Real Time Bidding in
  Internet Advertisement by Amar, Jonathan & Renegar, Nicholas
The Second-Price Knapsack Problem: Near-Optimal
Real Time Bidding in Internet Advertisement
Jonathan Amar*, Nicholas Renegar*, Haihao Lu
Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02142
amarj@mit.edu, renegar@mit.edu, haihao@mit.edu
In the past decade, Real Time Bidding (RTB) has become one of the most common purchase mechanisms
of the online advertisement market. Under RTB a unique second-price auction between bidders is managed
for every individual advertisement slot. We consider the bidder’s problem of maximizing the value of the
bundle of ads they purchase, subject to budget constraints, and assuming the value of each ad is known. We
generalize the problem as a second-price knapsack problem with uncertain resource consumption: the
bidder wins an auction when they bid the highest amount, but they pay an amount equal to the second-
highest bid, unknown a priori. We study the online setting, where the random permutation assumption holds
under ’stable’ setting assumptions, and show general methods for adapting both primal and dual online
knapsack algorithms to this setting, despite the prices no longer being known a priori. We give examples of
these algorithms, and show that we can achieve 1−  competitive ratios, where  is very small in practice,
and sublinear with respect to the number of ads. This stands in contrast to existing work on adaptive pacing,
which offers less powerful guarantees, but does so under more general settings. Numerical results from the
iPinYou dataset verify our results on a stable setting, and show that we can significantly outperform adaptive
pacing for more selective bidders, recovering a bundle of ads with an average of 25.9% more value.
Key words : auctions; online algorithms; internet advertising; real-time bidding; knapsack
1. Introduction
Online advertising is one of the fastest growing sectors in the Information Technology (IT) industry.
Total digital ad spending in the U.S. increased by 16% year-over-year in 2016 to $83 billion, and the
global digital advertising market is projected to reach a total of $330 billion by 2020. 1 Recently,
the increasing volume of impressions and ads led to the birth of ad exchanges. This resulted in a
larger market where advertisers have a stronger chance of locating a preferential ad-context and
publishers generate more revenue by being matched with these advertisers.
These ad exchanges allocate ads based on a variety of auction mechanisms. One popular auction
framework taking advantage of this is real-time bidding (RTB): an auction for each ad slot is
∗ These authors contributed equally
1 Digital advertising spending worldwide from 2015 to 2020 (in billion U.S. dollars)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/237974/online-advertising-spending-worldwide/
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Figure 1 RTB Flow Chart
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triggered when a user visits a web-page, with the auction containing specific contextual parameters;
the ad exchange then solicits bid requests from several Demand Side Platforms (DSPs), who each
can return a bid for an advertiser it represents; finally the winning ad reaches the publisher. The
paying price is set according to a second-price auction mechanism, i.e. the winner is the bidder
with the highest bid, provided that it is above the floor price set by the exchange, and the winner
pays a maximum of the floor price and the second highest bid. Given that all steps in the auction
mechanism must be completed before the web-page loads, each step must be computed quickly.
Notably the bid price calculated and submitted by a DSP must be done within a time-frame
of about 10 milliseconds. Furthermore, DSPs may receive a large number of bid requests from
exchanges per second, while billions of people explore the web around the globe. Hence, a DSP’s
job can be quite intensive, and there is a limit to the number of updates that can be made to the
bidding strategy in an online setting. We represent the process of online advertising, bidding and
ad allocation in Figure 1.
1.1. Our Contribution
We consider the problem from the perspective of a bidder (DSP) who represents a single advertiser.
The bidder wants to maximize the total value of the ads, indexed by i∈ I, they purchase, subject
to a total budget constraint, where the value of each ad vi is known to the bidder using contextual
parameters (user and ad slot information). The bidder must create a bidding policy where they bid
pii based on the information available to them at the time: the value of the ad vi, the results of the
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previous auctions, and their remaining budget. Unlike a traditional knapsack problem, there are
two significant difficulties when finding an optimal bidding policy. First, we do not know whether
we will win an auction based on the amount that we bid, since the paying price bi is not determined
before completion of the auction. Second, even if we win the auction, we do not know beforehand
the amount that we pay; we only know that it will be less than the amount we bid. We generalize
this framework to a second-price knapsack problem with uncertain budget consumption in (K-2).
We start our analysis by first studying the retrospective offline setting, in which the paying prices
bi are known. Considering this as a selection problem rather than a bidding problem, it reduces
to a traditional knapsack problem. From the offline greedy knapsack algorithm, a threshold policy
on the value-to-price ratio vi
bi
is optimal for the linear relaxation of this selection problem which is
a known result. That is, we select all ads where vi
bi
> λ∗, and some fraction where vi
bi
= λ∗, where
λ∗ ∈R is an optimal solution to the dual problem. Furthermore, in our specific context, where total
budget is large relative to individual ad prices, the greedy approach yields a near-optimal solution
to the integer selection problem as well.
The question is whether this can be turned into an implementable bidding strategy in the second-
price knapsack setting, where the information bi is not available at the time of bidding. We find
that because of the structure of the second-price auction mechanism, we can recover exactly this
near-optimal selection with a linear form of bidding only based on the value of the ad.
More generally, we consider the online setting with known time horizon. We show that under
mild assumptions (stable arrivals of bid requests, and stable reserve prices and competitors’ bid-
ding strategies) we can recover the random-permutation assumption that many online-knapsack
algorithms rely on. We then show that again using the structure of a second-price auction, we can
adapt very general classes of primal and dual online knapsack selection algorithms to this second-
price knapsack problem with uncertain budget consumption, and therefore enjoy their respective
competitive ratios.
We provide examples of these adapted second-price knapsack algorithms, which give us a com-
petitive ratio of 1− , and where the real-life context allows  to be small. This yields a strong
theoretical result on an important variation of the standard online knapsack problem which arises
in the context of Internet advertisement. Here instead of each item having a known price and value,
the item is sold through a second-price auction, having an unknown paying price to the bidder
that their bid must exceed in order to win. We thus refer to this problem as the second-price
knapsack problem.
Finally we use the iPinYou dataset to give numerical support to our work, and contrast with
adaptive pacing algorithms. iPinYou is currently the largest DSP in China. The dataset contains
logs of features, bids, assignments, feedback for all impressions over a season. We processed the
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contextual information for every impression, scored the market price and customer feedback (click).
From reviewing the data, the different features clearly affected the value of an impression which
also changed based on the advertiser. We fit a model for each advertiser to estimate the value
of an ad based on the contextual features. We evaluate the performance of our example bidding
strategy in the online setting and compare it to the offline optimum value for different advertisers
and budgets. While both bidding strategies perform near optimally for bidders with the budget to
purchase at least 1
4
of the ads they are interested in, only our example bidding strategy continues
to perform well for bidders with the budget to purchase only 1
16
of the ads they are interested in. In
these cases, we can outperform adaptive pacing by an average of 25.9%. These results demonstrate
the practical implications and effectiveness of our work.
While this paper focuses on the second-price knapsack mechanism, our results hold for all
deterministic, single slot dominant-strategy mechanisms that are incentive compatible, with zero
payments for the losing bidders. This encompasses many of the mechanisms that are used in prac-
tice for the online ad industry, with some notable exceptions being randomized mechanisms and
variations of first-price auctions.
1.2. Related Work
Knapsack problems and the design and analysis of online algorithms have been widely studied in
operations research, while the specific RTB context has been studied more within the computer
science community.
Our bidding policies are based on a theoretical analysis of the knapsack problem, and its variant
the packing problem. In fact we cast the optimal bidding policy as the solution to a knapsack
problem with budget uncertainty, as stated in (K-2). We refer the interested reader to Kellerer et al.
(2004) for a thorough review of knapsack problems. As for the online knapsack problem, Marchetti-
Spaccamela and Vercellis (1995) prove that the competitive ratio can be pushed away from near-
optimality to 1− 1
e
in the adversarial knapsack problem, even for randomized algorithms. Lueker
(1998) designs a value-to-bid threshold function which depends on the ratio budget spent over
leftover time to design a binary decision function. They then provide a scheme for approximating
the optimal thresholding function from observed realizations. The fractional knapsack problem has
been studied in Noga and Sarbua (2005). In our work we use packing duality theory, through which
we are able to derive the desired optimality guarantees.
In order to avoid the adversarial setup of the online problem, recent literature considered varia-
tions of the stochastic setting. Kleywegt and Papastavrou (1998) analyze the stochastic case where
items are drawn from an i.i.d. distribution. Under this framework, extensive research has been done
for the bandits with knapsacks problem. Further under the random permutation model, Devanur
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and Hayes (2009) prove a competitive ratio for their algorithm, which is based on a linear program
(LP). Their approach solves offline the LP associated to a sample of the items, which is large
enough to recover the distribution and thus provide concentration inequalities. These then provide
guarantees on the dual variables from the sub-sampled LP to the true LP. Integer optimization
tools then bridge the gap to recover the true solution. Feldman et al. (2010), Agrawal et al. (2014)
use similar ideas, but using a dynamic algorithm solving multiple LPs in online fashion. This
approach yields tighter bounds given the sharper estimate of the dual parameters from the data.
In their work, they focus on providing a competitive ratio analysis for when the input size is large.
On the other hand, Buchbinder et al. (2009) provide a wide variety of algorithms for more general
online optimization problems. They approach these by using Primal-Dual algorithms which yield
arbitrarily good competitive ratios while violating dual constraints by some factor. These compare
to thresholding functions by setting dual prices for budget consumptions. Babaioff et al. (2008)
analyze the special case of the secretary problem where weights are in {0,1}. Buchbinder and Naor
(2005, 2006) give an algorithm with a multiplicative competitive ratio of O(log(U/L)) for the online
knapsack problem based on a general online primal-dual framework where U,L are respectively
constraining upper and lower bounds on the individual value of ads, the resulting competitive ratio
scales with the bounds. Important work on the knapsack problem has also been done in the setting
where values are unknown. Badanidyuru et al. (2018) study this setting, and develop primal-dual
algorithms with sublinear regret.
We now relate the knapsack problems to the RTB literature. The design of a bidding strategy
requires an algorithm to cast real-time decisions for the bidder based on contextual information.
Recent contributions have been made to the bidding strategies by formulating the problem as
an online knapsack problem. Notably in the advertisement community, Chakrabarty et al. (2007)
design the problem by assuming bounds on items’ values, which are small compared to the total
budget. Similarly to Lueker (1998), they design an online algorithm based on a threshold function
guiding their bidding strategy. Their algorithms depend on some input parameters which directly
influences its performance. We extend their work by proving near-optimality of a threshold based
algorithm under some large-scale assumptions. The idea of using a threshold function was first
introduced by Williamson (1992), however they design an asymptotically optimal strategy only
when the arrival distribution is known.
The most similar work to our own is recent work on adaptive pacing for the online second-
price knapsack problem, for budget constrained advertisers. Balseiro and Gur (2017) describe an
adaptive pacing algorithm, when the valuation distributions for different bidders are unknown and
independent. The algorithm tries to learn a single dual parameter, which is an approach we follow
for part of our work as well, in order to keep the expenditure path stable over time. The adaptive
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pacing algorithm is shown to offer asymptotic optimality for both the stable and arbitrary settings,
and converges to an equilibrium in dynamic strategies. Existence of a sub-optimality constant
competitive ratio, versus the offline oracle, is also shown. Unlike our results in Section 2.3, though,
this competitive ratio is unknown.
We finally provide an overview of the RTB literature which often make very stylized and stringent
assumptions to provide tractability. These may be assumptions on the distribution of the arrivals or
assuming that the probability of winning an auction is a direct function of the amount bid. Keyword
auctions have been studied while others deal with more empirical and data driven questions (see
Edelman and Ostrovsky 2007, Zhou and Lukose 2007, Chen et al. 2011, Lee et al. 2012, 2013, Zhang
et al. 2014, Yuan et al. 2013, Ren et al. 2018). There is also relevant work in the stochastic setting,
by Jiang et al. (2014), which uses mean-field approximation to model competitors’ behaviors and
creates an algorithm that converges to an optimal solution in expectation.
We do not review the broader ad allocation and planning problems which can be combined to
our work on bidding strategies.
2. Model and Analysis
We take the bidder position of a DSP representing a single advertiser. When we are presented with
an auction for a new ad slot, we must decide whether to bid on the ad or not, and if so, how much
to bid. We consider the set of all non-anticipatory bidding policies Π, which satisfy our budget
constraint, where for any pi ∈ Π and ad i we bid some amount pii ≥ 0. We win the auction when
pii is the highest bid among our competitors and above the floor (reserve) price defined for the
auction, and we pay the maximum of the other bids and the floor price. We label this paying price
bi, and note that we win the auction whenever pii ≥ bi and always pay amount bi when we win.
Our main difficulty in designing a bidding strategy for the online setting is that we do not know
the paying price bi a priori. We first consider the offline traditional knapsack problem in which
bi is known. We then show there exists a bidding policy pi for the online second-price auction
setting where bi is unknown which is a linear function only of the value of the ads vi and some bid
parameter λ∗, and recovers a near-optimal selection.
For the online problem, we then provide our main results in Theorems 1 and 2, which establish
a methodology for adapting a variety of selection algorithms from the online traditional knapsack
problem to bidding algorithms in the second price setting. Using these theorems, we reconsider
the specific problem of training the bid parameter λ∗ for our second-price knapsack strategy, in
an online setting. We again relate to work on selection policies for the online traditional knapsack
problem, and show that work by Agrawal et al. (2014) for an online one-shot-learning algorithm
with a competitive ratio of 1− 6, can be applied to the online second-price knapsack problem
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where the paying prices bi are unknown, achieving the same competitive ratio. This is summarized
in Example 1.
2.1. Model Framework
We consider the model with respect to any feasible bidding policy pi ∈ Π satisfying the budget
constraint, where we bid pii for ad i. Although the paying price bi is unknown, we win if pii ≥ bi, and
pay amount bi. This allows us to cast the second-price knapsack problem with budget uncertainty,
hence labeled (K-2), for the online setting as:
max
pi∈Π
∑
i
1[pii ≥ bi]× vi s.t.
∑
i
1[pii ≥ bi]× bi ≤B a.s. (K-2)
In the setting where the paying price bi is known at the time of bidding, then the problem
reduces to a traditional knapsack problem. Items arrive with known value vi and paying price bi.
If we want to select this item we just bid some amount pii at least as large as bi and pay bi. If we
do not want to select the item we just bid pii = 0. We rewrite the problem by replacing our policy
pi with equivalent selection variables xi ∈ {0,1} and have:
max
x∈{0,1}
∑
i
vixi s.t.
∑
i
bixi ≤B (K)
2.2. Near Optimality of the Linear Bid
In this section we present our first result: an implementable bidding policy pi to recover a near
optimal selection of ads for the offline setting, using only the information that was available when
ads were presented and bids were solicited.
Proposition 1. For any set of ads {i ∈ I} with values vi ≤ vmax, we consider the problem of
creating a bidding policy to maximize total value subject to our budget B, as stated in (K-2). Then
there exists some constant λ∗ ∈R+ such that the linear bidding policy pi which bids an amount
pii =
vi
λ∗
yields a feasible selection of ads with a total value within vmax of the optimal value.
This is very similar to a recent result by Conitzer et al. (2019). However our work, which was
done independently, has a couple distinctions which are valuable to this paper. First, the Conitzer
et al. (2019) result proves optimality of the linear bid by assuming that the bidder can arbitrarily
choose to purchase all ads where the amount we bid pii equals the highest competitors bid, and
requires some a priori knowledge about how many ads this will apply to. In contrast, motivated
by the empirical data from Section 3, we make the assumption that the value to price ratios of
the ads are unique, and can directly show near-optimality without this a priori knowledge. The
Amar, Renegar, and Lu: Bidding Strategy in Online Advertising
8
second difference is that their proof is a very direct argument, while ours uses the dual problem
to prove near-optimality. Because the dual shows up again later in our paper, in Sections 2.3 and
3, we think our version of the proof gives some additional valuable insight as it relates to these
results. With these considerations, we include the full proof of Proposition 1 in the remainder of
the section.
We begin by assuming that the paying prices bi are known, in which case we can reformulate
(K-2) as the traditional knapsack problem (K). We then view the existence of dual prices that
allow us to solve the linear relaxation of the traditional knapsack problem exactly: we select an
item if and only if vi
bi
is above a certain threshold parameter λ∗ (see Fisher 1981, Kellerer et al.
2004, Bertsekas 1995).
We then demonstrate that the optimality gap between the linear relaxation of (K) and the
integer formulation is bounded by a small amount because of the specific RTB context. Next, we
turn offline selection into an implementable online bidding policy for (K-2), and in turn prove
near-optimality for this policy.
Let us again write our budgeted traditional knapsack problem as in (K). We will then relax
the integer constraints so that the bidder can purchase a fraction of an auction. More specifically,
let vi denote the value and bi the paying price of advertisement {i ∈ I}, and let B denote the
total budget. The knapsack problem (IP) and its linear programming relaxation (LP) can then be
written as:
max
xi∈{0,1}
∑
i
vixi s.t.
∑
i
bixi ≤B (IP)
max
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i
vixi s.t.
∑
i
bixi ≤B (LP)
The dual problem to (LP) is:
min
λ,zi≥0
λB+
∑
i
zi s.t. ∀i : zi ≥ vi−λbi (Dual)
= min
λ≥0
λB+
∑
i
(vi−λbi)+
= min
m
vm
bm
B+
m∑
i=1
(vi− vm
bm
bi)
where we assume impressions are sorted so that the ratios vi
bi
are in descending order, i.e. vi
bi
≥ vi+1
bi+1
.
The impressions are therefore ranked. Assume for simplicity that
∑
i bi ≥B otherwise we can select
all ads. As we are trying to minimize a convex piecewise linear function, the optimal value λ∗ is
interpretable as the value-to-price ratio threshold v
b
≥ λ, above which we will select an ad. We
provide the following known optimality lemma from the linear relaxation (LP), similar to Fisher
(1981).
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Lemma 1. Consider the offline knapsack problem (IP) and its linear programming relaxation
(LP). Let vi denote the value and bi the paying price of advertisement {i ∈ I}. There exists some
constant λ∗ such that we can recover an optimal solution to formulation (LP) using a fractional
selection policy x∗ such that
x∗i =
{
1 if vi
bi
>λ∗
0 if vi
bi
<λ∗
and x∗i ∈ [0,1] for the ads with vibi = λ∗.
Proof. The proof relies on the complementary slackness conditions. Let x∗ denote the opti-
mal solution to the (LP), and let λ∗ and z∗ the optimal solution to its dual formulation (Dual),
these exist by evident strong duality. The following complementary slackness condition entails the
described selection policy:
∀i : x∗i (z∗i − vi +λ∗bi) = 0 and (x∗i − 1)z∗i = 0
1. If vi
bi
> λ∗. Since vi − λ∗bi > 0, it follows that z∗i > 0 from the feasibility conditions for (4).
From the second complementary slackness condition we have x∗i = 1 so we fully purchase the ad.
2. If vi
bi
<λ∗. From the structure of (4) we see that we minimize each choice of z∗− i subject to
z∗i ≥ vi−λ∗bi) and z∗i ≥ 0. If vi−λ∗bi < 0 then it follows that we have z∗i = 0 and z∗i − vi +λ∗bi < 0.
From the first complementary slackness condition it follows that x∗i = 0 i.e. we do not purchase the
ad.
3. Otherwise vi
bi
= λ∗, we purchase some fraction, spending down the remaining budget.

If we make the additional assumption that the ratios vi
bi
are unique for our selection of ads I, then
we can additionally say that there exists threshold λ∗ such that we maximize total value
∑
i xi×vi
subject to our budget constraints by purchasing all ads where vi
bi
> λ∗, a fraction of the one ad
where vi
bi
= λ∗, and no ads where vi
bi
< λ∗. We will use this assumption in the next section. This
proved to be a reasonable assumption based on our numerical analysis of the values associated with
predicted click-through rates and paying prices for the iPinYou dataset as discussed in Section 3.
Near-optimality of the linear selection for the integer knapsack problem in the setting where
budget is large, and ad paying prices and values are small, is also an intuitive and straightforward
result. Let us consider the formulations (IP) and (LP), let us denote the offline dual threshold as
λ∗ and the optimal solution to (LP) as x∗. From Lemma 1, for the ads where vi
bi
> λ∗ we have
x∗i = 1, and for the ads where
vi
bi
<λ∗ we have x∗i = 0. Finally by our uniqueness assumption on
vi
bi
,
we have a single ad indexed by j with xj = 0 and xi = 0, ∀i > j.
Define the functions ZLP (B) and ZIP (B) as the optimal objective values for (LP) and (IP) with
budget B. We derive the following lemma which guarantees the near-optimality of our strategy:
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Lemma 2. Let x∗ be the optimal solution of (LP) with budget B, described in Lemma 1, where
j refers to the unique ad we purchase with xj > 0 and xi = 0, ∀i > j. We get the following bound
on the optimal selection strategy with budget B:
ZIP (B)−ZIP (B− bjx∗j )≤ vj (1)
Proof. We notice that when our budget is B + bj(1 − x∗j ) rather than B for (LP), then the
optimal solution from Lemma 1 is an integer solution, and thus also optimal for the corresponding
integer program. We find a similar result for a budget of B− bjx∗j as well. Combining these results
we have:
ZLP (B+ bj(1−x∗j )) =ZIP (B+ bj(1−x∗j )) =ZIP (B− bjx∗j ) + vj (2)
Then, since feasibility of a solution x stays ensured when provided with a larger budget, we get
the inequalities:
ZIP (B)≤ZIP (B+ bj(1−x∗j )) =ZIP (B− bjx∗j ) + vj (3)
We then simplify this inequality to the Lemma’s result. 
We interpret Lemma 2 as follows: if we adopt a slightly modified dual threshold strategy where
we buy all ads with λ∗ >
vj
bj
and no ads with λ∗ ≤ vj
bj
, then we end up with a feasible set of ads that
is within vj of the optimal value to the integer programming formulation (IP). When we combine
this with an assumption that the value of each ad is small relative to the total value of the optimal
bundle, we can say that we are near-optimal.
Assumption 1 (Low-Individual-Impact). For each ad, the value of each ad is negligible com-
pared to the total value attained.
This ”Low-Individual-Impact” assumption entails that bj  B and vj  ZIP (B). Let us point
out that when our budget becomes large, the slightly modified dual threshold strategy gives us
a selection of ads with value arbitrarily close relative to the integer optimal value. As such we
describe this strategy as near-optimal.
Note that so far our results, conditioned on us knowing the paying-price (cost) of an ad, are
essentially results for the offline knapsack algorithm with some context-specific attributes guar-
anteeing near-optimality. In practice though, real-time bidding for Internet ads is fundamentally
different as we do not know the paying price of an ad prior to bidding, and even if we win, the pay-
ing price will not be equal to what we bid. The question remains as to how we take a near-optimal
selection policy and turn it into a near-optimal bidding policy when paying prices aren’t known.
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The following lemma bridges that gap. It shows that because of the second price auction prop-
erties we can create an implementable online linear bidding strategy for (K-2), recovered from the
dual of the linear relaxation of the selection problem (K), where we recover exactly the ads where
vi
bi
> λ∗ and none of the ads where vi
bi
≤ λ∗, even when bi is unknown at the time of bidding. This
lemma is a known result, that has been used in several other papers (e.g., Zhou and Naroditskiy
2008).
Lemma 3 (Scaled linear bid). For any set of ads {i∈ I} with values vi and paying prices bi,
and for any constant λ∗, let pi∗ be the linear bidding strategy in the online setting which bids for
every impression the amount
pi∗i =
vi
λ∗
Then pi∗ exactly recovers the ads where vi
bi
>λ∗ under the second-price auction mechanism.
Proof. Let us consider the linear form of bidding with parameter 1
λ∗ , where we bid the amount
vi
λ∗ for ad i. The auction is won if and only if the paying price bi is lower than the bid, i.e.
bi <
vi
λ∗ ⇐⇒ vibi >λ∗.
Therefore because of the second price auction format we find that a linear form of bidding wins
the exact set of ads as the dual threshold strategy, and pays the same price. 
Combining this with the section on near-optimality of the dual threshold strategy, we arrive at
the first result of our work, in Proposition 1. We now provide the formal proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the (IP) and (LP) formulations from section 2.2 and the subse-
quent notations. With lemma 2, we know that the total value we can obtain from ZIP (B) is bounded
by the value of the linear relaxation with corrected budget and value, i.e. by ZLP (B−x∗i∗bi∗) +vi∗ .
Using lemma 3, we could recover the same set of ads as in the linear relaxation by using a scaled
linear bid with parameter 1
λ∗ for the online problem (K-2). Therefore by using this strategy, we
are within maxi(vi) of the optimal bidding strategy with budget B, i.e. the value ZIP (B). This
concludes the proof. 
Most importantly Proposition 1 holds for any set of ads. This means that even in the online
setting, for any fixed budget B and fixed time horizon T , the linear form of bidding with bid vi
λ∗ for
ad i will be near optimal on the upcoming set of ads. The difficulty comes in finding the parameter
λ∗ to use. In the next section we will explore how to find a near-optimal value of λ∗ in the online
setting.
2.3. Adapting Online Knapsack Algorithms
In this section we present our main results (Theorems 1 and 2), methods for adapting online
knapsack selection algorithms, where we choose to select ads based on some function of (vt, bt) at
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time t, to the second-price online knapsack setting, where we must make a bid without knowledge
of bt a priori. We present two such methods. The first is a deterministic method, and applies
widely to dual online knapsack algorithms, and the second is a probabilistic method, and applies
widely to primal online knapsack algorithms. We give examples for each method, including a one-
shot learning algorithm, that creates an online, near-optimal bidding policy under the random
permutation setting.
We say that a deterministic algorithm has competitive ratio α for the online problem if:
EI
[ALG(I)
OPT (I)
]≥ α
where OPT (I) denotes the performance obtained by the offline optimum on a random instance
I, ALG(I) is the performance of the online algorithm, and the expectation is taken over the
randomness in online instances.
Because most of the online knapsack algorithms of interest rely on the random permutation
assumption, we first explore what the random permutation assumption requires in sequential
second-price auctions. We assume a stable setting, where our competitors have consistent bidding
strategies, the auction platform keeps consistent reserve prices, and ad opportunities arrive in
a random order. From these assumptions we recover the random permutation assumption on an
expanded set of ads, that includes some synthetic zero-value ads. This property states that for a
set of future ads, they are equally likely to arrive in any order.
Assumption 2. Conditioned on n ads arriving over some period of time, all permutations of
the arrival order are equally likely.
Assumption 3. Competitors have consistent bidding strategies and the auction platform keeps
consistent reserve pricing methods over time. That is, given ad i with specific contextual parameters
(giving us value vi), the competitors bid the same amount for the ad, and the auction platform sets
the same reserve price for us, regardless of when it arrives. As a result, paying price bi is the same
for us if we win the ad, regardless of which week the ad arrives in.
These assumptions directly imply the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Random Permutation). Under Assumptions 2 and 3, we recover the random per-
mutation assumption.
Proof. From assumption 2, any arrival of ads, as measured by their values vi, are equally likely.
From assumption 3, the paying prices bi remain the same for all ads, regardless of the order they
arrive in. As a result any arrival of ads, as measured by both vi and bi are equally likely, which is
the random permutation property. 
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Now that we have established that the random permutation assumption follows from Assump-
tions 2 and 3, we directly get that the offline optimum is constant. In fact the optimum can be
different if the paying prices are instance dependent, e.g. without assumption 3. We continue to our
main results: methods for taking a wide class of online knapsack algorithms, where we select the
ad at time t based on some function of vt and bt, and turning them into online bidding strategies
for the second-price knapsack problem, where we need submit a bid without prior knowledge of bt.
For the remainder of the section, we let Bt denote the remaining budget at time t, and denote
Ht the history available to the bidder at time t (including the values of previous ads, the maximum
of our competitors bids, the reserve price, and the auction outcome).
2.3.1. Deterministic Algorithms The first method summarized in Theorem 1 holds for
deterministic online knapsack selection algorithms, and follows a similar reasoning to Lemma 3.
To the best of our knowledge, this Theorem can be applied to all dual-based online knapsack
algorithms.
Theorem 1. Consider an online knapsack algorithm, where at time step t we select an ad if
gt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht)≤ 0, for some continuous function gt which is monotonically increasing with respect
to bt and satisfies gt(bt = 0)≤ 0 and limbt→∞gt(.)> 0.
In the second price setting, we can recover exactly this set of ads without a priori knowledge of bt,
by bidding:
b′t = sup{b | gt(vt, b,Bt,Ht)≤ 0}
Further if gt implements a budget feasible selection algorithm then our bidding policy is also budget
feasible.
Proof. We prove that this algorithm recovers all ads where gt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht) ≤ 0, and no ads
where gt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht)> 0. If gt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht)≤ 0, then because gt is monotonically increasing with
respect to bt, we have that b
′
t ≥ bt, so we win the auction by bidding b′t. Similarly if gt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht)>
0, then because gt is monotonically increasing with respect to bt, we have that b
′
t < bt, so we do not
win the auction by bidding b′t.
Because b′t = sup{b | gt(vt, b,Bt,Ht)≤ 0} is not dependent on the a priori unknown price bt, this
is an implementable bidding strategy in the online second price knapsack problem. Further given
feasibility of the selection policy, then we have b >Bt⇒ gt(., b,Bt, .)> 0, so our bids verify b′t ≤Bt
which guarantees feasibility of our bidding policy. 
In the rest of the section, we give an example of how Theorem 1 can be applied. We consider
existing work on a one-shot learning for the online knapsack by Agrawal et al. (2014). Using
this, we show a bidding policy on the for the online second price knapsack problem, that has
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a competitive ratio of 1− 6 under the random permutation setting. While there are improved
results upon which Theorem 1 could be applied (e.g., Agrawal and Devanur 2015), we think the
given example is a very intuitive approach, shares similarities to Proposition 1, and gives a good
introduction to the process of adapting deterministic online knapsack algorithms.
Example 1 (Agrawal et al. (2014)). Let B denote total budget and let bmax be an upper
bound on the paying price for any ad. Select a training ratio  ∈ (0,1), s.t.  satisfies the budget
constraint
B ≥ 6× bmax× log(n/)
3
.
For the first fraction  of ads, determine the optimal dual price solution λ∗ to (OLA-LP) given
below:
max
xi∈[0,1]
∑
i∈ITrain
vixi s.t.
∑
i
bixi ≤ (1− )B (OLA-LP)
We then apply a bidding policy of pii = min{ viλ∗ ,B′} for ads i in our testing period, where B′ is
our remaining budget. Then the bidding policy pi is always feasible, and has a competitive ratio of
1− 6 relative to the optimal bidding policy over the entire set of ads I.
Contextually, since our budget is very large relative to ad prices, this process could be applied
for a very small , and would give a very strong competitive bound. For clarity we now present
Example 1 in Algorithm 1 as pseudo-code.
Algorithm 1 One-Shot Learning Algorithm
1: procedure Near-Optimal Bidding Strategy(,w) . t denotes time. w ∈N.
2: while t < w do
3: Record ad value and paying price. Continue.
4: Determine optimal dual parameters λ∗ on impressions in first w weeks from (OLA-LP), as
in Lemma 1.
5: while t < w do
6: For impression i, bid min{ vi
λ∗ ,B
′} where B′ is the left-over budget
7: If the auction is won, collect value and update budget
2.3.2. Probabilistic Algorithms The second method summarized in Theorem 2 holds for
probabilistic online knapsack selection algorithms. This Theorem can be applied to a variety of the
primal online knapsack algorithms, for one of which we give a more detailed example.
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Theorem 2. Consider an online knapsack algorithm, where at time step t we select an ad
with probability pt = pt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht), for some (right-)continuous function pt which is decreasing
with respect to bt, and satisfies limbt→0 pt(.)→ 1 and limbt→∞pt(.)→ 0. By defining Ft(bt) = 1−
pt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht), we create a CDF with domain bt ∈ [0,∞].
In the second price setting, we can purchase ads with the same probability as pt, without a priori
knowledge of bt, by bidding:
b′t = sup{b | Ft(b)≤ ut} where ut ∼Unif [0,1], i.i.d
Further if pt implements a budget feasible selection algorithm with probability 1, then our bidding
policy is also budget feasible.
Proof. We first show that Ft is well defined. Because pt(vt, .,Bt,Ht) is decreasing, and satisfies
limb+t →0pt(.)→ 1 and limbt→∞pt(.)→ 0, we have that Ft(bt) = 1 − pt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht) is increasing,
with domain bt ∈ [0,∞], with limb+t →0Ft(bt)→ 0 and limbt→∞Ft(bt)→ 1. Therefore Ft defines a
(left-)continuous CDF for some distribution.
Next, we show that randomly drawing u ∈U[0,1], and then bidding b′t = sup{b | Ft(b)≤ u}, will
recover ad t with probability pt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht). In the second price setting, we recover ad t if and
only if we bid b′t ≥ bt. This happens when u≥ Ft(bt), which occurs with probability 1−Ft(bt). From
the definition of Ft, we have 1− Ft(bt) = pt(vt, bt,Bt,Ht), so we recover the ad with the desired
probability pt.
Because b′t = sup{b | Ft(b) ≤ u} is not dependent on the a priori unknown price bt, this is an
implementable randomized bidding strategy in the online second price knapsack problem. Further
given feasibility of the randomized selection policy, then we have b > Bt ⇒ pt(., b,Bt, .) = 0⇒
Ft(b) = 1. Thus our bids verify b
′
t ≤ Bt w.p. 1, which guarantees feasibility of our randomized
bidding policy. 
In the rest of the section, we give an example of how Theorem 2 can be applied, to create a
bidding strategy for the second-price knapsack problem with a strong competitive ratio in the
stable setting.
Example 2 (Kesselheim et al. (2014)). Let B denote total budget and let bmax be an upper
bound on the paying price for any ad. Similarly, given a scaling factor f and a set of observed ads
S ⊂ [N ], we denote P(f,S) the set of feasible solutions to the linear relaxation of (K) where the
budget B is scaled by f and only ads from S can be selected. Formally this is the set {x | 0≤ xS ≤
1,
∑
i∈S xi ≤ fB, and xS¯ = 0}.
For every ad arrival t, we solve a fractional scaled ad selection for the knapsack problem, where
in particular the scaling factor is t
N
. We then interpret the fractional selection as a randomized
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selection policy, which can be readily implemented as a bidding policy in the second price setting
using Theorem 2. In particular at ad arrival t, we let x˜(bt) the function of optimal solutions to the
scaled problem
max
x∈P(t/N,[t])
∑
i≤t
xivi (PLA-LP)
with paying price bt and we define the CDF Ft accordingly. Then we sample u∼ Unif [0,1], and
bid min(Bt, sup{b | Ft(b)≤ u}) = min(Bt, sup{b | x˜(b)≥ 1−u}) where Bt is the leftover budget.
Consider a modified versions of our strategy. We first bid regardless of our leftover budget,
but only carry out the selection if the paying price is smaller than our leftover budget. That
is we bid 1sup{b|Ft(b)≤u}≤Bt × sup{b | Ft(b) ≤ u}. This modified bidding policy realizes the same
probabilistic selection policy from the randomized rounding procedure in Kesselheim et al. (2014).
The probabilities that previous allocations violate the budget constraint are the same for both
proposed and modified bidding policies. Therefore Lemma 2 and subsequently Theorem 3 from
Kesselheim et al. (2014) hold for our proposed bidding policy.
Finally our policy achieves the competitive ratio of 1− 45
√
bmax
B
. Equivalently ∀ > 0, for B ≥
bmax

, the randomized algorithm achieves an expected competitive ratio of 1− 45 relative to the
optimal bidding policy over the entire set of ads I.
Again in our context this process could be applied for small , and would give a very strong
competitive ratio. For clarity we now present Example 2 in Algorithm 2 as pseudo-code.
Algorithm 2 Primal based randomized algorithm
1: procedure Near-Optimal Bidding Strategy(,w) . t denotes time, St the observed ads.
2: for t <N do
3: Let x˜t the optimal solution to the scaled problem (PLA-LP) by a factor
t
N
on ads St, if
the paying price were bt.
4: Sample u∼Unif [0,1]. Bid min(Bt, sup{b | x˜t(b)≥ 1−u}).
5: If the auction is won, collect value and update budget
3. Empirical Results
In this section we use the iPinYou dataset to give numerical support to our work. We estimated
the click-through rate per advertiser from the contextual features for every impression, and we set
it as the value of an impression for a given advertiser. We then measure the efficiency of Algorithm
1, described in the previous section and show we are able to recover ad bundles in an online setting,
close to the value of the optimal bundle we could have selected. These results are robust to changes
in budget, and are consistent for all advertisers, which highlights the effectiveness of our methods.
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Table 1 The summarized log data format for an impression and their description.
Feature Description
iPinYou ID A unique identifier for every bid in an auction.
Timestamp Date of the auction.
Log type Outcome of the ad - whether the user clicked or purchased.
Bidding price The value bid by the advertiser.
Paying price The value paid by the winner of the auction, equal to the second highest bid.
Advertiser ID Information concerning the advertiser.
3.1. iPinYou Dataset
Until recently, academics were limited in studying the application of RTB strategies since bidding
data is generally kept secretive. Fortunately in 2013, iPinYou Information Technologies Co., Ltd
(iPinYou), which is currently the largest DSP in China, began a competition for RTB algorithms
and released three seasons of data for a small number of advertisers. Each season corresponds to
one week of data, with the entire release totaling 35GB. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first publicly available RTB dataset.
Data Format For the competition, iPinYou released information for different types of exchange
activity: bids, impressions, clicks, and conversions. Combined, these datasets capture most of the
relevant data from an auction: 1) The contextual ad features which are sent along with bid requests
(ad slot parameters, viewer demographics), 2) The winning bid amount and the paying price (which
we refer to as the market price), and 3) The user feedback, i.e. clicks and conversions on the won
impression. The dataset variables and advertisers also vary by season, so we chose to focus our
numerical testing on season three of the data, which included advertiser and user IDs.
The summarized features for the data and a full description are provided in Tables 1 & 2.
Table 2 The log data format for an impression
Col # Feature
1 Bid ID
2 Timestamp
3 Log type
4 iPinYou ID
5 User-Agent
6 IP
7 Region
8 City
9 Ad Exchange
10 Domain
11 URL
12 Anonymous URL ID
13 Ad slot Id
14 Ad slot width
15 Ad slot height
16 Ad slot visibility
17 Ad slot format
18 Ad slot floor price
19 Creative ID
20 Bidding price
21 Paying price
22 Key page URL
23 Advertiser ID
24 User Tags
Data Summary Statistics Season three contains information about five advertisers in different
fields: Chinese vertical e-commerce, software, international e-commerce, oil and tires. All advertisers
have click-through rate CTR on their won auctions inferior to 0.1%. Although the cost for achieving
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an impression is similar across advertisers (≈80 RMB per thousand impressions), the expected
cost per click differs by advertiser. Further the conversion rate CVR varies also. From a review of
the data it was clear the extent to which features affected the CTR, with the influence of a given
feature varying for each advertiser. This motivated modeling a different Key Performance Indicator
KPI estimator eKPI for each advertiser, to account different customer feedback trends depending
on the day and time. From the logs, we also review the variations of cost-per-click (CPC) compared
to individual features. We plot relevant CPC variations against different features in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Effective CPC against different features
This brief review of the iPinYou dataset suggests there exist opportunities for more efficient
bidding strategies among each advertiser. In addition we also report the basic statistics from the
third season of data (June 6-12) in Table 3.
Table 3 Season Three - Data Summary
Advertiser ID Impressions Clicks Tot. Bid Tot. Cost CTR eCPC
11458 3,083,055 2,452 924,916,500 212,400,191 0.080% 86.62
3358 1,742,104 1,350 405,466,041 160,943,087 0.077% 119.22
3386 2,847,802 2,068 854,340,600 219,066,895 0.073% 105.93
3427 2,593,765 1,922 612,619,071 210,239,915 0.074% 109.39
3476 1,970,360 1,027 488,187,425 156,088,484 0.052% 151.98
3.2. Data Pre-Processing
Starting with the iPinYou data shown in Table 1, processing was performed to get the data in a
usable format. We first deleted the small number of ad impressions for which there was missing
data and then deduplicated to remove a small number of redundant rows. We then extracted the
weekday and hour feature from timestamps. From user agent text, we extracted operating systems.
We also split the column of the tag list of user interests into a large number of binary variables,
representing user interests in all the specific categories. We also removed unique features or nearly
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unique such as Bid ID, Log Type, iPinYou ID, URL, Anonymous URL ID and Key Page URL that
we could not train our predictors on.
3.3. Experimental Setup
Success in our empirical work will be measured with respect to our valuation of the advertisements.
In practice, advertisers value success based on their click-through-rate (CTR) and conversion rate.
Each advertiser values the balance between clicks and conversions differently, which is captured in
the general literature as the Key Performance Indicator KPI, defined as a linear combination:
KPI = 1clicks +α×1conversions
where the factor α is advertiser specific. However as seen in Table 3, the small number of conversions
presented an issue and we made the decision to set α= 0 for our testing.
The classical approach in RTB literature has been to evaluate the predicted click-through rate
pCTR, and conversion rate pCV offline on a training dataset, and to bid an amount in online
testing that is a function of these estimates, with the campaign objective of creating bid amounts
in order to maximize KPI over won auctions subject to total budget B (special case of (K-2)):
max
bid
∑
KPI s.t. spent budget≤B
In contrast, to evaluate the threshold strategy, our plan is to create a pCTR estimator for the
training dataset, and to set the value of each ad vi equal to the pCTR estimate for our ad. We
will in turn start by bidding our value, and find the optimal threshold λ∗ value for  = 1.0%
of our testing data, in accordance with Algorithm 1. We will then evaluate the effectiveness of
bidding min{ vi
λ∗ ,B
′} for the remaining 99.0% of the data, where vi is the known value of the ad
(as predicted by our estimator), and B′ is our remaining budget. To evaluate effectiveness we will
compare
∑
i∈I′ vi for this selection of ads I
′, compared to an optimal selection of ads across the
entire testing dataset, capturing the loss in value we incur during training.
To calculate the pCTR for each ad, from the training data we split most categorical features
into multiple columns of {0,1}, such as the long-term interests and the demographic fields. A single
advert instance is represented by vector of over 50 features. For pCTR prediction we then relied on
logistic regressions from R’s GLM package. While this gave us a good estimator and was sufficient
for our purposes, in practice the eKPI prediction is an essential piece of any bidding strategy and
advertisers would be well-served by devoting considerable resources to creating the best prediction
model possible. Our priority is evaluating the effectiveness of our policy given an assumed set of
values vi for ads chosen reasonably.
To create our testing data, we limit our season three to one million records per advertiser, and
then randomly permute the ad arrivals. This allows us to evaluate the threshold strategy in a
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situation where arrival rates and bidding strategies by our competitors are stable. We hope that
in this setting we can recover a selection of bids close to the optimal bundle.
A common difficulty in the experimental setup for RTB research comes from the fact that
we only possess the click-through and conversion information given the advertiser that won the
auction. Thus in our testing phase, we cannot let an advertiser buy an advert they did not win. We
approached this the same manner as previous researchers, and we design a bidding system where
each advertiser is only shown auctions they won from the data, but we allow each advertiser a
budget only a fraction of the amount they actually spent. Otherwise, with full budget, the optimal
strategy would always be to win every ad they previously won at the same price, which is made
possible through bidding your remaining budget at every step because of the second-price auction
mechanism. We chose to evaluate several fractional budget amounts, and we set the budget for
each advertiser as 1
2
, 1
4
, 1
8
, and 1
16
of the original total they actually spent.
Let us specifically review the testing process for a fixed advertiser under a budget limit. At each
time step:
1. We draw an ad randomly from our test set (that the current advertiser won from our data)
and we pass it as a bid request.
2. The bidding strategy computes a bid amount for this contextual request, which does not
exceed our remaining budget.
3. If the bid is higher than the paying price, then the advertiser wins the auction. If the advertiser
wins then the paying price is subtracted from the remaining budget and we add the impression’s
log and value vi = eKPI to the outcome total.
3.4. Results
In this section we present the main results of testing for the third season of iPinYou data. We
randomly select one million records per advertiser from the third season, to create our testing
data. We then trained our eKPI predictor using a logistic regression on the entire testing data. A
summary of the testing data, including the total eKPI predictions are given in Table 4.
Table 4 Season Three Subset for Online Testing - Data Summary
Advertiser ID Impressions Clicks Tot. Bid Tot. Cost CTR eCPC
1458 1,000,000 800 300,000,000 68,884,867 0.080% 86.11
3358 1,000,000 798 232,746,786 92,410,850 0.080% 115.80
3386 1,000,000 732 300,000,000 76,918,986 0.073% 105.08
3427 1,000,000 742 236,188,992 81,096,832 0.074% 109.29
3476 1,000,000 515 247,763,552 79,181,869 0.052% 153.75
The next step was benchmarking the optimal bundle that could be achieved for a given budget
in the test dataset, in the offline setting. We created benchmarks for each of the five advertisers,
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and each choice of budget ( 1
2
, 1
4
, 1
8
, and 1
16
). Then as a benchmark of the the test data, for each
budget fraction we calculated λ∗ and the value of the optimal bundle of ads that could be selected.
The benchmarks are summarized in Table 5.
Table 5 Online Testing - Optimal Benchmarks.
(a) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/2 Optimal Bundle
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Total eKPI Actual Clicks % of Total Clicks
1458 770 96.2% 767 95.9%
3358 760 95.2% 742 93.0%
3386 615 84.0% 521 71.2%
3427 704 94.8% 645 86.9%
3476 494 96.0% 439 85.2%
Total 3,342 93.2% 3,114 86.8%
(b) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/4 Optimal Bundle
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Total eKPI Actual Clicks % of Total Clicks
1458 722 90.3% 716 89.5%
3358 693 86.9% 645 80.8%
3386 480 65.6% 362 49.5%
3427 641 86.4% 593 79.9%
3476 437 84.8% 392 76.1%
Total 2,973 82.9% 2,708 75.5%
(c) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/8 Optimal Bundle
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Total eKPI Actual Clicks % of Total Clicks
1458 680 84.9% 664 83.0%
3358 634 79.4% 591 74.1%
3386 370 50.6% 249 34.0%
3427 585 78.8% 541 72.9%
3476 371 72.0% 339 65.8%
Total 2,639 73.6% 2,384 66.5%
(d) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/16 Optimal Bundle
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Total eKPI Actual Clicks % of Total Clicks
1458 646 80.7% 631 78.9%
3358 585 73.3% 544 68.2%
3386 285 38.9% 193 26.4%
3427 539 72.6% 515 69.4%
3476 307 59.7% 297 57.7%
Total 2,361 65.8% 2,180 60.8%
After benchmarking we tested the online version of Algorithm 1. To do this we determined the
optimal threshold λˆ for each budget choice on the = 1.0%. During this training period we bid our
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value, and deplete the entire training budget. We then took the remaining data, and applied the
dual threshold bidding with that same constant λˆ in the online setting. We recorded the total value
vi = eKPI and actual clicks for the selection of ads. The test results are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6 Season Three - Algorithm 1 Online Testing Results.
(a) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/2 Results
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Optimal Bundle eKPI Actual Clicks % of Optimal Bundle Clicks
1458 756 98.3% 754 98.3%
3358 741 97.5% 728 98.1%
3386 587 95.5% 490 94%
3427 686 97.5% 620 96.1%
3476 482 97.6% 426 97%
Total 3,253 97.3% 3,018 96.9%
(b) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/4 Results
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Optimal Bundle eKPI Actual Clicks % of Optimal Bundle Clicks
1458 712 98.5% 702 98%
3358 675 97.3% 630 97.7%
3386 456 94.9% 339 93.6%
3427 626 97.7% 575 97%
3476 426 97.5% 382 97.4%
Total 2,894 97.3% 2,628 97%
(c) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/8 Results
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Optimal Bundle eKPI Actual Clicks % of Optimal Bundle Clicks
1458 669 98.4% 653 98.3%
3358 618 97.6% 578 97.8%
3386 355 95.7% 236 94.8%
3427 572 97.9% 528 97.6%
3476 362 97.6% 335 98.8%
Total 2,576 97.6% 2,330 97.7%
(d) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/16 Results
Advertiser ID eKPI % of Optimal Bundle eKPI Actual Clicks % of Optimal Bundle Clicks
1458 669 98.4% 653 98.3%
3358 618 97.6% 578 97.8%
3386 355 95.7% 236 94.8%
3427 572 97.9% 528 97.6%
3476 362 97.6% 335 98.8%
Total 2,576 97.6% 2,330 97.7%
As expected the one-shot learning dual threshold bidding strategy works extremely well in situ-
ations where the arrival rates are relatively constant and bidding strategies of our competitors are
Amar, Renegar, and Lu: Bidding Strategy in Online Advertising
23
Table 7 Season Three Testing - λ, λˆ comparisons (scaled by 106).
Advertiser ID λˆ1/2 λ
∗
1/2 λˆ1/4 λ
∗
1/4 λˆ1/8 λ
∗
1/8 λˆ1/16 λ
∗
1/16
1458 2.21 1.89 4.18 3.91 6.92 6.47 10.37 9.8
3358 2.35 1.97 4.44 3.97 7.42 6.8 11.42 10.7
3386 5.83 5.23 10.02 9.29 15.32 14.4 25.1 23.4
3427 2.49 2.19 4.67 4.34 7.64 7.21 13.82 12
3476 2.05 1.7 5.07 4.69 10.09 9.59 18.54 17.7
stable. In these situations we can directly use a dual-threshold bidding strategy determined from
historical data and in our online setting we can recover a bundle of ads with eKPI relatively close
to that of that near-optimal bundle. In these situations our λˆ also tends to be very close to that of
the optimal λ∗ as shown in Table 7. Our performance is also robust to our budget fraction, meaning
this learning algorithm works well for more selective bidders. From the consistent performance of
the online algorithm in Table 6, we observe that in the empirical data, advertiser revenue is not
sensitive to small errors in estimating λˆ.
We also compared our algorithm’s performance to that of adaptive pacing. We apply adaptive
pacing in accordance with the algorithm used to show it’s theoretical properties (Balseiro and
Gur 2017). We begin by bidding our value while learning to be more selective over time, and
use the recommended step size (that is, µ0 = 0 and  =
1√
1,000,000
). For each strategy, we record
the percentage of the optimal bundle’s eKPI that was recovered, as well as the performance ratio
(defined as the value of Algorithm 1 to that of adaptive pacing). The results are recorded in Table
8. The comparison is interesting. For advertisers with a large budget fraction of 1
2
(enough to
afford half the ads they are interested in), we see that adaptive pacing performs almost perfectly.
In contrast, though, we see that the performance of adaptive pacing degrades significantly as
advertisers become more selective. At budget of 1
16
, which represents a much more common level
of selectivity among bidders in reality, adaptive pacing incurs significant performance degradation.
This makes sense intuitively for selective bidders, as adaptive pacing’s dual parameter search not
only takes longer to converge to the optimal, and then oscillates more significantly around the
optimal because of the step direction imbalance. For example when the budget fraction is 1
16
, the
algorithm buys roughly that fraction of impressions, so about 15
16
ad arrivals are not purchased
and lead the algorithm to become slightly less selective, while 1
16
are purchased and lead the
algorithm to become significantly more selective. In contrast when the budget fraction is 1
2
, this
search is much more balanced and has less variance. In comparison, Algorithm 1 does not have
these downsides, and outperforms adaptive pacing by 25.9% on average when the budget fraction
is 1
16
. Thus algorithm 1 could have a significant practical impact for bidders in practice, where they
typically only have a budget large enough to purchase a small fraction of the ad impressions they
might be interested in.
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Table 8 Algorithm 1 and Adapative Pacing Comparison.
(a) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/2 Percent of Optimal Bundle Recovered
Advertiser ID Algorithm 1 Adaptive Pacing Performance Ratio
1458 98.3% 99.5% 98.8%
3358 97.5% 99.4% 98.1%
3386 95.5% 99% 96.5%
3427 97.5% 99.4% 98.2%
3476 97.6% 99.6% 98%
Total 97.3% 99.4% 98%
(b) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/4 Percent of Optimal Bundle Recovered
Advertiser ID Algorithm 1 Adaptive Pacing Performance Ratio
1458 98.5% 97.8% 100.7%
3358 97.3% 98.3% 99%
3386 94.9% 96.5% 98.4%
3427 97.7% 98% 99.7%
3476 97.5% 98.1% 99.3%
Total 97.3% 97.8% 99.5%
(c) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/8 Percent of Optimal Bundle Recovered
Advertiser ID Algorithm 1 Adaptive Pacing Performance Ratio
1458 98.4% 93.3% 105.5%
3358 97.6% 95% 102.7%
3386 95.7% 88.9% 107.6%
3427 97.9% 93.9% 104.2%
3476 97.6% 92.4% 105.6%
Total 97.6% 93.1% 104.8%
(d) Season Three Testing - Budget 1/16 Percent of Optimal Bundle Recovered
Advertiser ID Algorithm 1 Adaptive Pacing Performance Ratio
1458 98.7% 78% 126.6%
3358 98% 83.7% 117.1%
3386 95.5% 66.1% 144.4%
3427 97% 78.5% 123.6%
3476 97.2% 73.3% 132.7%
Total 97.6% 77.5% 125.9%
4. Conclusions
In this paper we studied strategies for real-time bidding on Internet advertising exchanges, under
the second-price auction format. Assuming the values of ads are known, we showed the near-
optimality of a bidding strategy that purchases all ads where the paying price bi are lower than
the vi
λ∗ for some constant λ
∗. We then showed that because of the second-price auction format,
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this selection of ads is recoverable by bidding exactly vi
λ∗ . This shows optimality of a linear form of
bidding under very few assumptions.
We then showed two methods for taking primal and dual online knapsack algorithms, which
select ads based on vi and bi, and turning them into bidding strategies for the second-price knapsack
problem, where we do not need a priori knowledge of bi. We showed that under a stable setting
the random permutation assumption could be applied, and give two examples of online knapsack
algorithms, adapted to the second-price knapsack setting. In particular, we showed how with an
online one-shot learning algorithm, we could use a linear form of bidding to recover a bundle of
ads with competitive ratio 1− 6, where  could be small given the context.
Evaluating the strategy on the iPinYou dataset, we showed that we can recover something close
to the optimal bundle of ads as expected, giving support to the findings. In particular, for bidders
that are more selective, and only have the budget to purchase 1
16
of the ads they are interested in,
we show that our methods can significantly outperform adaptive pacing, raising the total value of
ads purchased by an average of 25.9%, implying that there is a tremendous opportunity to improve
capital allocation for a multi-billion dollar area.
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